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The quality of schooling in South Africa is a continuing cause for concern.  
There is broad consensus around the goals of reform, but not about how these 
goals might or should be achieved.  This is because there is little evidence on the 
effects of alternative reforms allowing assessment of their efficacy and utility.  
This paper argues for much more experimentation in educational reform, i.e. 
running experimental reforms and monitoring closely their effects.  Some 
evidence is available from projects and programmes funded by foreign donors, 
business donors or occasionally provincial education departments.  This paper 
examines some of these, focusing especially on the design and evaluation 
methodology of the Imbewu programme run in the Eastern Cape funded 
through British aid.  Unfortunately, little attempt has been made to standardise 
or collate research on the effects of these initiatives.   
 
 
How Do We Learn About Improving 
Educational Outcomes? 1 
 
There is a substantial body of work documenting the poor performance of South 
Africa’s public schools, and a similarly substantial body of evidence on the main 
causes of this poor performance. Too many South African children receive a 
poor education, and hence poor opportunities in life, not so much because of a 
shortage of resources invested in schooling, but rather because the considerable 
resources that are invested are invested very inefficiently. There are too few 
textbooks in classrooms, teachers are poorly motivated and sometimes 
incompetent, and management is all too often deficient. Many children bring 
considerable disadvantages with them to school, on account of their family 
background and neighbourhood environment. The schooling they receive is 
                                                          
1 This Working Paper comprises Chapter 6 of a Report commissioned by the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, in the South African Parliament, on Making An Informed 
Investment: Improving the Value of Public Expenditure in Primary and Secondary Schooling 




insufficient to overcome these disadvantages, ensuring that inequalities in 
society are reproduced. Disadvantaged children get the worst opportunities. 
 
All of this is widely recognised within national and provincial education 
departments. The various education departments have identified what they aim 
to achieve. Now, as the Joint Education Trust has suggested, the question is not 
so much ‘what to do?’ as ‘how to do it?’ 
 
‘During the first five years of South Africa’s first democratic 
government the Department of Education has established a coherent 
policy framework for the reform of the public schooling system. The 
priority now is to implement these policies in order to improve the 
effectiveness of schools in delivering quality education. The problem 
is no longer what to do – this has been established by much 
consultation, research and parliamentary debate, and regulated and 
legislated in numerous policy statements, White Papers and 
Government Gazettes. The problem now is how to implement these 
policies.’ (JET et al., 1999: 8) 
 
The activities that attract most attention in the media (in large part because the 
politicians involved seek media coverage) are likely to be of secondary 
importance. The Minister of Education visits schools and admonishes teachers 
and students for negligence. Former President Nelson Mandela presides over the 
opening of new school buildings in rural areas, paid for by big business. For 
sure, both the culture of schooling and physical infrastructure are important, but 
it is far from clear what effect admonitions and new buildings have on what 
actually happens inside the classroom, and whether student performance is 
significantly improved. 
 
Elected political leaders and appointed officials have to make decisions on how 
to allocate scarce resources, with the goal (we hope) of maximising the benefit 
to children in terms of the quality of education. They do so without adequate 
information on the costs and benefits of alternative uses of resources. There is a 
pressing need to generate such data. This working paper is concerned with 
developing the procedures required to identify the benefits and costs of different 
policies. How can we know which policies ‘work’, and which do not, in terms of 
building students’ skills? What can we do – and what should we be doing – so 





The suite of forms of assessment that are being developed by the national 
Department of Education might provide some information of what works and 
what does not work. This suite comprises the following (see further, Seekings, 
2002): 
 
• The existing matriculation examination: this provides an indication of the 
performance of the one-third to one-half of South African children who reach 
grade 12; 
• The national Assessment Policy for students: this provides detailed 
information, through continuous assessment and a public examination (with 
some external moderation) at the end of grade 9, in order to assess the 
performance and progress of individual children; 
• ‘Systemic evaluation’ of the schooling system: testing of samples of pupils in 
specific grades across the country in order to assess the performance of the 
education system as a whole; 
• ‘Whole school evaluation’ of individual schools: a combination of external 
and self-evaluation, but without external assessment of pupils’ performance, 
in order to assess the performance of individual schools; this is an essentially 
qualitative evaluation. 
 
In principle, if these were conducted in an exemplary manner, they would 
generate much of the information required to identify what ‘works’ and what 
does not. The results of the grade 9 and 12 examinations, together with the 
results of testing as part of systemic evaluation, would provide some indication 
of the performance of individual schools. The Whole School Evaluation would 
provide some information on what schools are actually doing, which might 
reveal the differences between schools that produce good results and those that 
produce poor results (however measured, and taking into account family and 
community factors). And the information on individual students would provide a 
very detailed ‘micro’ picture of what this means for individual children. 
 
But the contribution of this suite of forms of assessment will be undermined by 
two major problems. First, there is insufficient regular, external testing 
assessment of pupils. Secondly, it will be no easy task to ensure that the 
information provided by Whole School Evaluation is both of high quality and 
usable. Both problems stem from the scale of the exercise: an estimated 2 500 
specialist supervisors, across the country, visiting 27 000 schools at regular 
intervals and writing up their reports. The numbers of people involved is 
perhaps of less concern, since they will be playing a valuable developmental 




of supervisors visiting schools means that there will be a flood of reports to 
provincial and national departments, and it is far from clear what bureaucratic 
procedures and structures will be capable of making sense of this. 
 
In short, whilst the suite of forms of assessment might provide some data on 
performance and some information required for decentralised developmental 
efforts (i.e. for teachers to assist students whose progress is slow and supervisors 
to assist schools and teachers whose practice is deficient), it is unlikely to 
provide sufficient data on what ‘works’ and what does not. These forms of 
assessment are necessary but not sufficient. In assessing how to improve 
students’ performance, experimental programmes and projects are indispensable. 
Such programmes involve concentrating assessments on small numbers of 
schools that have been selected as the sites of focused interventions or reforms. 
The Department of Education’s suite of forms of quality assurance is a suite 
designed for an education system that is basically working well, and simply 
needs some tinkering at the edges; it is not designed to deal with an education 
system that is in crisis in many respects, and which probably requires radical 
interventions and reforms. 
 
Careful planning, implementation and evaluation in experimental programmes 
should provide lessons that save time and money when broader reforms are 
attempted. Sometimes educational programmes are not designed as experiments, 
but nonetheless may serve this purpose. Conversely, projects may be set up as 
experiments but have no value due to careless design or shoddy evaluation. It 
must be emphasised that experimental programmes are not a substitute for the 
kinds of assessment that the various departments of education have set up or are 
planning; experimental programmes cannot provide the important information 
that other forms of assessment generate. Rather, they are a complement, 
providing different information for different purposes. 
 
The use of experimentation is strongly advocated by Hanushek et al. in their 
study of education in the USA, Making Schools Work: Improving Performance 
and Controlling Costs. Hanushek et al. (1994) note that, in the USA (as in South 
Africa), there are grave concerns with the efficiency of public spending on 
education. In the USA, standards have been stagnant (or even fallen) whilst 
costs have risen. ‘The nation is spending more and more to achieve results that 
are no better, and perhaps worse’ (ibid: 25); America’s ‘schools are 
demonstrably inefficient’ (ibid: 7). Hanushek and his co-authors, who include 
noted left-wing economists, argue that both the costs and the benefits need to be 




education. Above all, Hanushek et al, argue, schools themselves need to be 
transformed into ‘learning institutions’. ‘How’, they ask (ibid: 125), ‘can 
schools hope to improve systematically without ascertaining what is and is not 
currently working?’ What is needed is an altogether new commitment to 
evaluation. Hanushek et al condemn existing approaches: 
 
‘Schools invest remarkably little in information about their own 
operations. Compared with that on private industry, the amount of 
research and development on schools is minute. So also is the amount 
of resources and energy devoted to quality assurance in schools. More 
than that, school personnel are accustomed to think that evaluation of 
programs and activities is unimportant, more a nuisance than a 
necessity.’ (ibid: 148) 
 
Evaluation is not the same thing as a slavish use of indicators, whether 
indicators of inputs or of outputs. 
 
‘Some argue that improved student testing and assessment can lead 
reform by itself. With accurate assessments of student performance 
from tests, runs the argument, schools will automatically focus on 
improving test scores: teachers will adjust to improve student 
achievement, management decisions will become obvious, and reform 
will occur almost spontaneously. We know of no evidence to suggest 
this is a realistic expectation.’ (ibid: 126) 
 
Improved assessment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful 
educational reform. What is needed in addition is the development and initiation 
of ‘a systematic approach to experimentation and evaluation of school 
programs’ (ibid: 127). 
 
Hanushek et al. advocate ‘randomised assignment experimentation’. In order to 
isolate the effect of any particular policy intervention, the effect of the 
intervention on one group of schools and students needs to be compared to a 
control group of schools and students which is identical to the target group in all 
ways except that the intervention was not extended to them.  
 
‘Suppose, for example, that one wants to study the effect of smaller 
classes on student achievement. If researchers simply look at 
performance in the large and small classes found in a typical school 




student performance come from the effects of class size or from the 
specific students and teachers in the different classrooms. For 
example, if the school principal attempted systematically to provide 
small classes for the students performing at the lowest level, 
performance might appear to be lower in the smaller classes, even 
though that is actually not an effect of the smaller classes per se. To 
overcome such problems, students (and teachers) could be randomly 
assigned to classrooms with varying numbers of students, which 
would reduce the chance that pre-existing performance differences 
would bias measurements of performance by class size.’ (ibid: 143) 
 
Clearly this is easier with some kinds of reform (i.e. experiment) than others, but 
the general point is valid.  
 
The lessons of experimental projects are clear from international experience. A 
classic example concerns class size. Reduced class size is often advocated as a, 
if not the, main way of improving student performance. It is also one of the most 
expensive possible reforms, as smaller class sizes require more teachers, and 
salaries already account for the lion’s share of expenditure in most school 
systems. In 1985, the American state of Tennessee initiated an experimental 
programme to ascertain what difference was made by reduced class sizes. At the 
time most classes had between 22 and 25 students in them. The programme 
(named STAR, for ‘Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio’) covered 79 schools, 
including kindergarten and the first three grades of primary school, for a four-
year period. Students in these schools were assigned randomly to either (1) 
standard sized classes, (2) standard sized classes with a full-time teaching 
assistant in addition to the teacher, or (3) smaller classes, with between 13 and 
17 students. Each year, students were tested in reading, maths and other skills. 
The experiment found that reduced class size resulted in a small improvement in 
students’ performance in kindergarten and perhaps in first grade also, but made 
no difference in grades two and three. The presence of a teaching assistant made 
no difference in the regularly-sized classes. The experiment suggested that the 
huge increase in expenditure required to reduce class sizes in grades one to three 
would probably be wasted (Hanushek et al., 1994: 144-5).  
 
In South Africa, as we have already seen, huge resources have been spent on 
reducing class size in larger classes. Porteus (2000) is typical of many writers in 
suggesting that we should assume that class size makes a difference until we 
have powerful evidence to the contrary. Our evidence is still weak, and not 




considerable difference around the ages of thirteen and fourteen, but no 
difference at other ages. Crouch and Mabogoane (2001) found that it made some 
difference for some subjects. But, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
experimental evidence on the effects of class-size in South Africa. In a country 
with nearly 27 000 public schools, it is bizarre that no experimental research has 
been done into the effects of class size on learner achievement. Of course, the 
need for equity required that class sizes in most schools were adjusted after 1994 
to redress the racial discrimination of the apartheid years. The departments of 
education rightly made these adjustments rapidly. But now, faced with 
improving the quality of education across the board, it would be very useful to 
know precisely what effect there would be on pupils’ performance if additional 
resources were invested in the number of teachers in schools (or, more 
specifically perhaps, what other conditions are required for such an investment 
to pay dividends). This information might be generated through a programme 
under which the national Department provided conditional grants to the 
provinces for the specific purpose of reducing class sizes in some schools or in 
some districts, and monitoring carefully the progress made by students in these 
schools compared to students in schools that were similar in all respects except 
that their class sizes were not reduced. 
 
Hanushek et al.’s recommendations need to be applied to the South African 
case. We can study international experiences of policy reforms as much as we 
like, but the exercise will provide ‘answers’ to the question ‘what works in other 
countries?’, not ‘what works in South Africa?’ What is needed is the systematic 
analysis of the massive amount of experience that exists in South Africa as the 
inevitable consequence of investing more than R50 billion or so each year in 
primary and secondary schooling. This analysis requires urgently not only the 
continued development of data collection on both financial and other inputs and 
the output of student achievement, but also the design of educational 
investments along quasi-experimental lines.  
 
The Range of Recent Experiments in South 
Africa 
 
South Africa has spent huge sums on education, but very little of this has been 
spent in ways that can be considered experimental. Policies have rarely been 
designed or assessed in ways that provide evidence on their effects. National and 
provincial education departments have rarely designed and assessed their core 




Education Action Zones, discussed below), where reforms have had 
experimental value. There are no doubt many reasons for this lack of well-
designed and measured experimental reforms, but I imagine that they include: 
the inadequacy of systems of assessment and evaluation that the post-1994 
government inherited from the apartheid state; the shortage of discretionary 
funds in most provinces; the prevalence of ‘inside-out’ philosophies of change 
in education (see Muller with Roberts, 2000), and a pervasive and related 
hostility to formal testing that is indispensable in the evaluation of experimental 
programmes. 
 
Most of the experience with experimental programmes comes from partnerships 
between education departments and the private sector, in which funds from 
private or foreign sources have been used to supplement the standard provisions 
of the public sector. There have been, in South Africa, a large number of school 
improvement programmes that should generate important evidence on what 
works and what does not work in school improvement. As Taylor (2001) writes, 
‘there is no shortage of effort in the field of school reform. Besides the 
government’s own programmes in this area, it is estimated that something in the 
order of 20 percent of the nation’s nearly 30 000 schools are involved in donor- 
and NGO-initiated development projects of one or other kind, with a total off-
budget expenditure of around R200m annually.’ Other estimates of the value of 
donor funding for school reform programmes put the figure much higher. In 
1999/2000, South African business is estimated to have invested R645 million in 
education projects.2 
 
Just as there are reasons why education departments have been slow to adopt an 
experimental approach to reform, there are clear reasons why the private sector 
has done so. Most obviously, donors and NGOs are very aware that the funds 
they commit to education are paltry in comparison to the investment of tax 
revenues by the state. If the sole purpose of their expenditures was to improve 
the quality of schooling for the children directly affected, their efforts would be 
insignificant. But if their funds are invested wisely, they should have a much 
greater impact indirectly, through demonstrating what kinds of intervention 
work and what kinds do not. The experimental features of these programmes 
driven by the private sector are often explicit. The National Business Institute, 
for example, supported the Quality Learning Project (QLP, see below), on the 
basis that the programme’s design would enable lessons to be spread to other 
parts of the country and the successful features of the programme replicated. 
 
                                                          




Curiously, neither the national nor the provincial departments of education 
appear to have compiled adequate lists of existing programmes, and are yet to 
conduct any rigorous analysis of the lessons of these programmes. In 1999 the 
national Department, through its National Centre for Curriculum Research and 
Development (NCCRD), initiated an audit of curriculum-related research and 
developmental projects. The audit revealed a total of 326 projects, ranging from 
the massive to the tiny, including projects that were not primarily curriculum-
oriented as well as those that were. But the published report from this audit 
(Department of Education, 2000b) provides very little analysis or information. 
The Gauteng Education Department has also compiled a list of its partnerships 
with private organisations, as well as preparing a policy framework governing 
its partnerships. In the Western Cape, the provincial education department has 
taken the initiative in establishing a ‘Western Cape Education Trust’, one of 
whose first tasks has been to compile a list of programmes in the province. It 
does not appear that any such list exists for the Eastern Cape. None of these 
initiatives appears to be concerned with learning the lessons of education 
programmes. Their purpose seems to be promote co-ordination (to be generous) 
or departmental control (to be cynical).  
 
The primary attempts to collate purposefully basic data on a number of major 
programmes and their evaluations, with the goal of systematically examining 
using the experience of programmes to identify what works, have been made by 
JET. In 1995-96 JET conducted an investigation into INSET programmes (see 
JET, 1996). More recently, JET embarked on a careful study of a selection of 
major programmes in a range of fields. Besides this specific line of inquiry, JET 
has amassed a collection of perhaps one hundred and fifty project evaluations – 
a valuable archive of research. Government departments might usefully build 
similar collections; if they have begun to do so, this is not apparent to senior 
officials within those same departments! 
 
Critical assessments of programmes in the early- and mid-1990s are not 
encouraging. Writing about INSET programmes in early 1996, Jansen 
concluded: 
 
‘Teacher development delivered through NGOs in the form of in-
service education (INSET) does not produce significant learning gains 
in the classroom. One evaluation report after another has delivered the 
same finding: that while INSET provides important motivational 
benefits to practising teachers, and begins to influence the behaviours 




into learning gains for students. Yet millions of rands have been 
invested in teacher development programmes…’ (Jansen, in JET, 
1996: 13). 
 
In a thoughtful reflection on recent, independently-initiated programmes with a 
wider ambit than in-service teacher training alone, Taylor acknowledges that 
‘the effects of these efforts have been hard to discern to date’, approaches are 
sometimes inappropriate, and the relationships between NGOs and state are 
fraught with tensions (2001: 1). As we shall see below, further criticisms can be 
levelled at these experimental programmes. Notwithstanding all of this, the 
experience of school reform programmes provides the most important evidence 
on what works and what does not work in school improvement, evidence which 
is required to guide us in the reform of South Africa’s schooling system as a 
whole.  
 
Some indication of the range and scope of the experimental programmes that are 
underway in different parts of South Africa is provided by the following brief 
descriptions of seven major interventions. Most of these programmes are in 
early stages, but they are all pioneers in one way or another and thus demand 
analysis, even if our analysis is necessarily tentative or preliminary. 
 
READ began work in Soweto over twenty years ago, and has since extended to 
primary schools across the country. READ ‘offers pupils a sound, book-based 
education foundation’ (READ, 1998: 3). Its work entails teacher training and 
mentoring, together with the provision of a range of books (to replace reliance 
on a single textbook), with the goal of improving pupils’ reading and writing 
skills. As READ emphasises: ‘Teachers cannot teach and pupils cannot learn 
effectively, nor can the new curriculum be efficiently implemented, without the 
delivery of cost effective teaching and learning materials, together with training 
in their use’ (READ, 1999: 28) Much of READ’s work is organised and funded 
as separate projects. For example, READ ran a pilot project in what used to be 
the Transkei and is now part of the Eastern Cape, beginning in 1995 and 
concluding in 1998. In the four years of this particular project, 187 courses were 
attended by an average of twenty-three teachers. At an annual cost of only R53 
per pupil, READ argue that their model is one that can be widely replicated 
(and, moreover, would cut repetition rates and thus save money). In 1999 READ 
launched its Learning for Living project, with an award of R153 million from 
the Business Trust. This project is intended to reach 12 000 teachers in about 





Imbewu (meaning ‘seeds’ in Xhosa) is a school improvement project in the 
Eastern Cape. It was initiated in October 1997 with a grant of R75 million from 
the British Department for International Development (DfID). In 2001 it was 
extended for a further five years, with a new budget of R240 million. In its first 
phase it focused on five hundred primary schools in clusters each of five 
schools. The project sought to improve school management (including the 
functioning of governing bodies formed by parents), to supply teaching and 
learning materials, to improve teaching through short courses and workplace 
support, and to improve management at the district, regional and provincial 
levels. There was also systematic monitoring and evaluation, with a full 
evaluation undertaken at the end of the first phase (1997-2000). The second 
phase is expanding the project to cover 3 500 schools. 
 
Mahlahle, like Imbewu, seeks to improve school management as well as 
classroom practice. It is located in the Giyani and Phalaborwa districts of the 
Northern Province, where it has targeted fifty primary and thirty-six secondary 
schools. As with Imbewu, most of the participating schools are in rural areas that 
were part of the former bantustans. Mahlahle, meaning ‘the bright morning star’, 
had an initial budget of just R 29.5 million for the four years 2000-2003.  
 
The Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP) is a project of the 
National Business Initiative, which was founded in 1995 by senior business 
leaders with the goal of helping to ‘make the new South Africa work’. The NBI 
explicitly identifies its programmes as experimental, intended to produce 
‘systemic change that could be replicated or implemented at scale in socio-
economic delivery mechanisms’. EQUIP is one of the NBI’s major programmes. 
The NBI assessed that high failure rates in schools were primarily due to a ‘lack 
of governance and management skills in schools and districts, as well as a lack 
of quality teaching by teachers’ (NBI, 2000: 10). EQUIP would focus on local 
management and planning. Schools would be helped to prepare their own 
development plans, which would have to be discussed and approved in the 
school governing body. The necessary resources would be secured through 
sponsorship by business, to the tune of about R20 000 p.a. for three years. The 
development plan would be implemented with the assistance of whatever service 
providers were required. EQUIP first began to work with schools in 1996. The 
pilot phase included fifty schools, but the programme has since expanded to 320 
schools in Gauteng, the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and (most recently, in 
2001) the Eastern Cape. EQUIP serves as a partnership between business and 
government, helping communities to help themselves. As NBI puts it: 




the government cannot do it alone’ (NBI, undated: 4). EQUIP’s role is to guide, 
support and encourage community efforts. 
 
The General Education and Training In-Service Project (GET-INSET) is a 
collaborative project between a consortium of NGOs and the Western Cape 
Education Department. Initiated in 1998, it is now involved in 85 historically 
disadvantaged primary schools in urban and rural areas. Its four-year budget 
amounts to about R10 million. It provides subject-specific teacher training in 
workshops, together with textbooks and other ‘learner support materials’, and 
in-school support. It sees itself as a pilot project, with an experimental design. 
 
The Quality Learning Project (QLP) is a new programme, focused on five 
hundred secondary schools in twenty districts across the country (including six 
in the Eastern Cape but just one in the Western Cape). The QLP seeks to 
improve the maths, reading and writing abilities of high school students in the 
selected schools. The focus is on mathematics and language because it is 
believed that these provide the foundation for all other learning. Like Imbewu 
and Mahlahle, the QLP also entails improving district and school management, 
teacher development and systematic monitoring and evaluation. The total budget 
for the QLP is R139 million over five years, funded by the Business Trust. 
 
A programme that focuses entirely on management is the District Development 
and Support Programme (DDSP). The DDSP began to be implemented in 
2000. It is focused on district-level management, and seeks to strengthen the 
links between district officials and schools. It is funded by the USAID. 
 
The Education Action Zones (EAZ) programme is the only one of the 
programmes discussed here which is entirely a departmental initiative and not an 
NGO initiative (albeit run in partnership with provincial education departments). 
The Gauteng Department of Education initiated the EAZs programme in January 
2000, targeting seventy-one ‘profoundly dysfunctional’ secondary schools (all 
scoring below 20 percent in the 1999 matriculation examination). The 
programme did not involve much additional funding, but rather intensive 
monitoring (Fleisch, 2001). 
 
Taylor has distinguished between different ‘generations’ of programmes, with 
the second generation learning from the experience of the first generation. 
READ and GET-INSET are what ‘first generation’ programmes, focused 
heavily on what goes on inside the classroom, and aiming to enhance pupil 




learner support materials. Imbewu and Mahlahle are ‘second generation’ 
programmes, combining a concern with teaching methods with a concern with 
educational management. Both programmes invest heavily in training and 
support for principals, district level managers and personnel in provincial 
education departments.3  
 
The second generation programmes benefited from the lessons learnt from their 
first generation predecessors. By 1996 it was clear that teacher training alone 
was having too little effect on pupils’ performance (JET, 1996). The shift to the 
second generation also reflected the prevalence in official rhetoric of a concern 
with ‘governance’ and management issues (see the Education White Paper and 
the 1996 South African Schools Act). The experience with the second 
generation programmes has, in turn, informed the design of the most recent 
programmes. Taylor includes the QLP in his category of ‘second generation’ 
programmes, but it is perhaps not so easy to classify. In addition to emphasising 
classroom practice and managerial reform, the QLP also stresses the importance 
of teachers’ subject knowledge. Perhaps this might be thought of as a ‘third 
generation’ programme, informed by the experience of Imbewu and other second 
generation programmes which alerted planners to the problem of teachers’ lack 
of basic subject knowledge. 
 
An alternative typology for categorising programmes might distinguish between 
the two kinds of educational reform that are conducive to experimentation. 
Some reforms or programmes entail the direct allocation of additional 
resources. For example, funds are provided for additional teachers or, more 
often, for additional training for teachers or managers. A second kind of reform 
is institutional in nature, involving changes to systems of governance, incentives 
or accountability. These institutional reforms would have indirect effects on the 
use to which resources are put. In practice, programmes generally entail 
elements of both kinds of reform, but in different proportions.  
 
                                                          
3 As Roberts points out, Imbewu was primarily concerned with teacher development, and 





Table 1: Some characteristics of selected programmes 
 
Programme Additional resources invested Institutional reform 





Technical support for provincial 




Mahlahle As above - 
EQUIP 
Up to the school to decide Development planning 
(including increased 
community involvement) 
GET-INSET Teacher training (plus LSMs, in-school support) 
 
QLP As with Imbewu - 
DDSP - - 
EAZs In-school support; LSMs Accountability (to provincial education dept) 
LSMs: ‘Learning support materials’, i.e. textbooks etc. 
 
Most of the programmes described above concentrate on the provision of 
additional resources for targeted purposes (see Table 1). Unsurprisingly, sums 
are invested in much the same general categories: training for teachers, books 
and other learning support materials, and in-school support. Some (the ‘second 
generation’) programmes also include management training, others (the ‘first 
generation’ programmes) not. 
 
Most of these programmes have only a minor institutional component. Only the 
Education Action Zones has a primary focus on institutional reform; in the case 
of the EAZs, the focus is on accountability. Most of the programmes have only a 
limited conception of accountability and limited provision for incentives. This is 
because these programmes are driven by the private sector (albeit in partnership 
with provincial education departments). NGOs and donors clearly cannot call 
schools, teachers or education officials to account in the same way as provincial 
departments, which use threats of disciplinary or other action. Nor can they 
restructure the governance systems of schools beyond what is permitted by 





NGOs and donors have only two, weak ways of demanding accountability. First, 
they can threaten to withdraw. In cases like EQUIP, where there are financial 
incentives to persevere, the threat of withdrawal might prove significant. 
Secondly, they can try to boost the capacity of the ‘community’ to hold schools 
to account. For sure, some of these programmes require a demonstrable 
commitment from school governing bodies, which might serve to maintain some 
accountability. But these are lines of accountability that presumably did not 
prove effective before. It is difficult to avoid the impression that programmes 
like READ and Imbewu and the QLP have in common an assumption that the 
provision of skills, whether to teachers or managers, will result in improved 
performance. In other words, they diagnose the problem as primarily one of a 
lack of skills, not a lack of incentives or pressure. In this they run counter to 
much of the international literature on educational reform, which attaches 
considerable importance to issues of accountability and incentives (see 
Hanushek et al., 1994).  
 
While there are good reasons why most experiments have been driven by the 
private sector, there are constraints on the both the scale and range of 
experiments that the private sector can drive in public schools.  
 
• Firstly, the sums spent by the public sector dwarf those spent through NGOs; 
the scale of experimentation potentially available within the public sector 
therefore dwarfs the possibilities for the private sector;  
• Secondly, the private sector has a limited ability to experiment with 
institutional reforms; 
• Thirdly, it is the state’s responsibility to ensure thorough evaluation of all 
experiments in order to assess what is ‘best practice’ in different situations, 
and to ensure that the investment of public monies in education is an 
informed investment.  
 
For these reasons it is especially imperative that the public sector – meaning the 
national and provincial education departments – embraces an experimental 






The Design of Experiments: A Case-Study of 
Imbewu 
 
The case of Imbewu provides a useful study of how these independently-
initiated programmes are designed and implemented. Imbewu is probably the 
most advanced of what Taylor terms the ‘second generation’ programmes. It is 
concerned not only with practices inside the classroom but also with governance 
and management within the schooling system. According to Taylor (of JET): 
 
‘Imbewu is the Xhosa word for ’seeds’. Botany offers a very apt 
metaphor for schooling. Classrooms, which nurture the minds of our 
future citizens, may be likened to the leaves of a plant where its food 
is manufactured. But the leaves cannot exist without the branches 
which support and supply them with their needs. Similarly, classrooms 
are maintained by a set of institutions, starting with budgetary 
allocations and policies at the national level, which are implemented 
through an array of management and supply lines through provincial, 
regional, district and school offices. And the entire edifice would not 
stand without deep roots in the community and the ongoing leadership 
of parents and civic leaders through community-based governing 
structures. Public schooling is a truly systemic enterprise: no one part 
of the system can function effectively if all the other parts are not in 
good working order’ (Taylor, 1998: 7). 
 
The Imbewu programme was designed through a process of ‘negotiations’ 
between the donor (the British Department for International Development, 
DfID) and the national and provincial departments of education. Details were 
then worked out ‘by the project team, led by JET, in close discussion with the 
[provincial] department, and under the overall authority of the project steering 
committee’.4 Planning took into account international models, in part through 
the involvement of British advisors brought in by the donor, DfID. Planning 
began in 1995, with implementation starting in October 1997. The programme 
was located in the Eastern Cape, officially because of the dire state of education 
there, but perhaps also because the British government wanted to be seen to be 
doing something in the ANC’s heartland. 
 
The project team diagnosed the problem in Eastern Cape schools as a systemic 
problem. The need for systemic reform was underscored by the difficulties in 
                                                          




both establishing a baseline study of administrative capacity in the provincial 
education department, and evaluating progress during the Imbewu programme 
(see JET, 2000a). Baseline studies of classroom practice, student performance 
and school management and leadership, by Eric Schollar, confirmed the 
appalling state of education in the province (ESA, 1999).  
 
Imbewu combines a strong emphasis on classroom practice with a similar 
emphasis on management and governance. In-service training is provided for 
three ‘key’ teachers from each participating school. This training comprises 
short courses interspersed with practical assignments and workplace support. 
The programme also provides a package of ‘learning support materials’ 
(stationery, books and other teaching materials), as well as training on their use 
and management. With respect to school management, managers at every level 
(i.e. school, district, regional and provincial) are provided with training (and 
technical assistance) in financial, information, provisioning and human resource 
systems. School principals are recognised as especially important players. 
Community involvement is also encouraged.  
 
Classroom and management/governance training are partially integrated through 
a comprehensive training programme. This comprises thirty-four training 
modules, including four introductory modules, five EMD (education 
management development) modules, twenty INSET modules, and five further 
modules. The introductory modules cover the basic Imbewu approach, namely 
‘vision crafting’, ‘whole school development’, managing change and the 
theoretical approach of ‘practice-based inquiry’; these modules are attended by 
principals and selected teachers from participating schools. The EMD modules 
are targeted on principals. The INSET modules are organised into four sets of 
five modules for teachers in mathematics, science and technology, English and 
the foundation phase (JET, 2000b: 9-10). Modules are taught in a five-week 
cycle. 
 
The programme design also provides for the benefits to be passed onto non-
participating personnel or schools. Observers refer to the lessons being 
‘mainstreamed’, i.e. incorporated into the mainstream of schooling practice in 
the province. The replication of improvements is to be achieved in three ways. 
Firstly, the programme adopts a ‘cluster’ model of participating schools. 
 
‘Project schools are grouped in clusters of five: these are generally 
within easy reach of each other. Training and support is delivered 




teachers from each school, together with the principal, members of the 
school governing body and district officials receive training. This 
team, in turn, is responsible for sharing the knowledge and skills with 
other members of staff, with in-school support from the training 
providers’ (Taylor, 1998: 8). 
 
This cluster model can be contrasted with the more traditional ‘cascade’ model, 
according to which training is initially provided to a small number of officials, 
who themselves train the next layer of personnel, who in turn train the next 
layer, and so on. Unfortunately, it seems that the benefits get diluted as they 
‘cascade’ down through the layers (ibid). Further, participants in each cluster 
attend ‘cluster meetings’ in addition to training workshops. These meetings are 
intended as a forum for discussion of what had been learnt and of people’s 
experiences in implementing this (JET, 2000b: 11). District-based development 
teams provide support. 
 
Secondly, the programme is said to have been ‘entrenched’ in the provincial 
Department of Education. JET describe this as one of the ‘groundbreaking 
innovations developed by Imbewu’!  Whilst the programme has its own 
specialist management team, the provincial government has authority, and 
government officials have been seconded to the programme. Initially, much of 
the training and other work was done by NGOs; later, departmental personnel 
assumed some of these roles. The provincial department also receives technical 
assistance (JET, 2000b: 13; Perold, 1999: 8-10). Thirdly, Imbewu was designed 
with a systematic performance of monitoring and external evaluation, to ensure 
that the lessons can be learnt readily and applied elsewhere. This is discussed 
further below. 
 
One hundred schools participated in the pilot phase, with a further 423 schools 
joining later. Most were in deep rural areas in former bantustans. A few were in 
townships around Cradock and Grahamstown. In total, schools in 28 districts 
participated. 
 
The programme supposedly entails a particular philosophy of school change. 
Participants talk of ‘being Imbewu-ised’, referring to the programme’s emphasis 
on attitudinal change, with transformation coming from within as much as 
without (see JET, 2000b: 6-8; Perold, 1999: 11-20). An integral component of 
the programme is what is called ‘vision crafting’, i.e. the initial deliberation 
among participants about their goals and objectives (see JET, 2000b: 10). The 




‘Imbewu model for school development and transformation’, produced by the 
Eastern Cape Education Department. The ECED diagnoses that the problem is a 
lack of ‘spirit’ in schools: 
 
‘Teachers complain of principals who are both incompetent and 
authoritarian. Principals complain of teachers who abandon their 
classes, who are alcoholics or who show little interest in the welfare of 
the school or their learners. Learners raise issues of harassment, sexual 
abuse, assault and a general lack of caring. Some teachers feel 
physically threatened by learners who are out of control. The litany is 
endless. 
 
The key, then, is to determine how to rekindle the spirit in individuals 
and restore the essence that gives the school its life. The 
transformation strategy must find the means to ensure that the spirit of 
individuals and the uniqueness which they bring to the school are both 
transformed into positive action’ (ECED, 2000: 2-3). 
 
This is an extreme version of an ‘inside-out’ approach (see Muller with Roberts, 
2000), with little or no emphasis placed on external accountability or incentives. 
It is reported that some of the foreign ‘technical’ advisors were hostile to the 
formal assessment of pupils. Whether this kind of transformation from within is 
viable or leads to improved pupil achievement is, of course, an empirical 
question, and one that needs to be tested. It is unfortunate that a programme as 
large as Imbewu simply assumed that it was. 
 
The experience with Imbewu has informed the design of subsequent 
programmes, most notably Mahlahle and the QLP. This is evident with respect 
to the methodology of evaluation, the content of the programme, and the link 
between these. First, baseline studies are integral to the evaluation. Two baseline 
studies were done for Mahlahle: the first, in late 1999, examined management, 
administration and governance at regional, district and school levels. The 
second, in mid-2000, examined teaching itself. Secondly, these baseline studies 
are being used to inform project design to a much greater extent (JET, 2000c). 
 
Thirdly, the Imbewu experience affected the design of Mahlahle and the QLP 
directly. The original Business Plan for the QLP identified three elements in the 





• ‘Building capacity and systems at the District and other levels of the 
provincial Departments of Education. This is an essential element in 
institutionalising any external intervention. Well-functioning district 
offices are key to sustaining support for schools once the project has 
come to an end, and to replicating the intervention in non-project 
schools; 
• Improving the ways schools function. Building the capacity of 
individuals – such as INSET for teachers, or management training 
for principals – has been found to have no effect on improving 
learning if schools, the key institutions of delivery, are not 
functioning effectively. 
• Intervening directly at the classroom level. Local and international 
experience indicates that changing the classroom behaviours of 
teachers and learners is the most intractable element of any school 
development programme, and that if this is not addressed directly 
then learning outcomes are unlikely to change. [Previous research] 
... strongly suggests that the biggest problem at this level is the poor 
conceptual knowledge of teachers concerning the subjects they are 
responsible for’ (JET et al., 1999: 8-9). 
 
Both Mahlahle and the QLP comprised five ‘programmes’. These included, in 
both cases, programmes on ‘district development’, focused on management and 
administration at the district level, and ‘school development’, focused on 
management, administration and governance at the school level. Both also 
included a programme on monitoring and evaluation. Mahlahle’s other two 
programmes covered ‘resource provisioning’, i.e. the distribution and use of 
textbooks and other teaching materials, and ‘classroom support’, i.e. 
interventions in classroom practice. QLP’s other two programmes covered 
‘learning outcomes and assessment practices’, i.e. the development of 
assessment practices to guide and monitor teaching and learning, and ‘teacher 
development and curriculum intervention’, concerning other aspects of 
classroom practice (JET, 2000d: 4; 2001). 
 
The experience of Imbewu was also supposed to inform the design of what is 
sometimes known as ‘Imbewu II’, i.e. the second phase subsequent to the initial 
three-year programme. One identified lesson was the problem of a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach, i.e. an approach that assumes that the same package of services is 
appropriate in every participating school. This is a growing concern with the 




the ‘Imbewu Transitional Phase Operational Team’ seems to include little 
critical reflection on the experience of Imbewu’s first three years. 
 
 
The Methodology of Evaluation: Imbewu 
 
The value of experimental projects in school improvement depends on the 
quality of the evaluation of the experiment. The programme of evaluation for 
Imbewu serves to illustrate what needs to be done, and also what problems can 
be anticipated. The documentation available on the evaluation of Imbewu 
includes: baseline, midterm and final studies of classroom practice, school 
management and student performance (ESA, 1999, 2000a, 2001b); an 
assessment of the first set of Imbewu training modules (Moyo and Rembe, 
2000); a series of studies of management at the provincial and district levels; 
two additional evaluations at approximately midterm (Crown Agents, 1999; 
Perold, 1999); and a further assessment done by Roberts for the JET (JET, 
2000b), as well as studies of vision crafting and the secondment of provincial 
department officials. The evaluation of Imbewu required a separate and 
dedicated managerial structure, in the form of a sub-committee of the Project 
Steering Committee. 
 
Imbewu’s objective was to improve student performance, especially in basic 
literacy and numeracy. The outcome of improved performance should be 
measurable through numeracy and literacy tests. Imbewu also has ‘intermediate’ 
objectives, which are less easy measured but are observable. It is as important to 
evaluate success in these as to measure student performance, because the 
evaluation of success in achieving intermediate objectives helps us to identify 
which factors or mechanisms serve to effect changes in student performance. 
These intermediate objectives include such things as classroom practice and 
school management. 
 
The core of the evaluation process is the series of studies of the impact on 
Imbewu on participating schools. After a competitive process, the tender was 
awarded to Eric Schollar and Associates (ESA), who applied a methodology that 
they had already used in an evaluation of READ in the same area. The schools 
study comprised four main components: 
• Tests of student performance, using separate literacy and numeracy 
instruments designed by ESA; 




• Interviews with principals, teachers and members of school governing 
bodies; 
• Scrutiny of records, for example school registration records and teachers’ 
lesson plans. 
 
There are two differences between these school studies and the Whole School 
Evaluation proposed by the national Department of Education. Firstly, the ESA 
studies included externally-run tests of student performance, which are absent in 
the Department’s proposals. Secondly, the Department’s proposals are seen as 
having a developmental purpose as well as a monitoring process, meaning that 
the experience of evaluation is explicitly designed to feed immediately into 
improved practices, whereas the ESA evaluation is purely a monitoring exercise.  
 
The baseline study covered twenty selected schools that were participating in 
Imbewu, together with a control group of four non-participating schools. A total 
of 666 students sat the tests in the twenty participating schools, and a further 160 
in the control group. Fifty-one teachers were interviewed, and their classes were 
observed. All twenty principals were also interviewed, and management systems 
and the curriculum in the twenty schools were described (ESA, 1999: 7-11). The 
midterm study, conducted twelve months later, comprised the same set of 
components. At the same time the same evaluation was carried out in a further 
twenty-three schools which had not participated in the first year of Imbewu and 
thus were at the baseline stage. The final evaluation covered twenty-four schools 
which had been participating in Imbewu for two years and twenty-five which 
had been participating for one year only. A total of 1 748 pupils were tested, and 
125 teachers were interviewed and their classes observed (ESA, 2001b: 7-8). 
 
The ‘evaluation’ process gathered a lot of ‘baseline’ data on the problems in the 
schooling system. This data, and data from the mid-term study, proved useful in 
redesigning aspects of the programme, and perhaps in reminding participants of 
its objectives. But the crucial data in terms of evaluating whether Imbewu 
‘works’ – or, more precisely, how its various components have ‘worked’ 
separately and collectively – is the data on changes over time. Have students’ 
performances in tests improved? Have classroom practices improved? Has 
school management improved? Has district and provincial management 
improved? 
 
The evaluation reports indicate the many difficulties involved in evaluating a 
programme like Imbewu. Can one assess changes over such a short period of 




across a number of levels in order to achieve systemic change, it is not expected 
that significant learning gains will be achieved by Imbewu during the first three 
years’ (JET, 2000a: 3). In fact, for reasons that are not clear, the time gap 
between the baseline and midterm studies, and midterm and final studies, was 
only one year in each case, so that the total time-span was two rather than three 
years (ESA, 2001b: 5). Given that Imbewu could only be expected to have an 
effect on pupils’ performance after teachers and managers had attended training 
and implemented the lessons in their daily practice, two years is a short period of 
time in which to expect much change in measured pupil performance. 
 
Further problems arise from the limits of selective observation and interviewing. 
What can one tell from observing classes, given that teachers might put on a 
non-random class to impress the observer? As ESA point out in their midterm 
report: 
 
‘It is a commonplace that the presence of an observer affects, to one 
degree or another, the routine functioning of a school or classroom 
that he/she wishes to observe. Virtually all field researchers would 
assert, for example, that they are frequently aware that a lesson they 
are observing has been presented previously, and that pupils are often 
‘coached’ beforehand’ (ESA, 2000a: 12). 
 
ESA report that when researchers visited schools unexpectedly, for whatever 
reason, teachers would usually say that they were ‘not prepared for Imbewu’ that 
day! Many of the teachers who had been forewarned ‘happened’ to present a 
class on ‘Water is the source of life’ which had been a model lesson in an 
Imbewu training module. Researchers therefore observed the same lesson being 
presented many times, and in different grades! The obvious conclusion is that, 
when there was forewarning of the presence of observers in class, the 
researchers observed very atypical lessons in terms of teacher (and possibly 
student) preparation, as well as teacher-student relations. As ESA note, it is at 
the very least unclear whether trained teachers are able ‘to transfer what they 
learned about methodology through a sample lesson to the rest of their teaching’ 
(ibid: 14).  
Interviewing or other self-reported data is also problematic. How does one 
interpret what one is told by teachers or principals? ESA note the following: 
 
‘It has been our experience that principals and teachers routinely 
provide positive endorsement of all intervention projects. Perhaps the 




they fear support they are currently receiving will be lost if they are 
critical. Whatever the reason, we have experienced the phenomenon in 
so many different contexts and provinces, that we consider impact 
data derived from interviews alone to be unreliable. While, in other 
words, one would not expect interviewees to be critical of 
interventions which are genuinely effective, blanket approval in itself 
does not necessarily prove that the intervention has, in fact, been 
effective. Further, interviews which provide closed sets of possible 
responses to attitudinal questions provide too many specific cues to 
interviewees appearing to have a more detailed knowledge and 
understanding of an intervention than is actually the case’ (ibid: 11). 
 
Referring to previous work by ESA, Taylor has also warned about the uncritical 
use of self-reported data. Self-reported data can be influenced not only by 
obvious self-interest but also by ‘excessive good faith: programme staff are 
idealistic and dedicated; participants have worked hard and are excited about the 
possibilities of the new methods solving what seem to be insurmountable 
problems; everyone wants the programme to succeed. Under such circumstances 
it is easy to confuse best intentions, and changes in the outer forms of teaching 
and learning, with qualitative improvements’ (in JET, 1996: 52). 
 
Two constraints on what can be learnt from the evaluation resulted from choices 
made by the programme managers. Optimally, the performance of a panel of 
students would be assessed over time, with the performance of participants in 
Imbewu classes being compared with that of a control group of non-participants. 
This, indeed, was the original intention. Instead of doing this, however, the 
evaluation was limited to testing the performance of successive cohorts passing 
through each grade. In other words, the performance of successive cohorts of 
students was taken as an indicator of the effectiveness of the teacher. In addition, 
there was no real control group (although schools that only joined after the first 
year of the project could be treated as a quasi-control group for the first year). 
The number of students assessed was also reduced markedly. As ESA (1999: 2) 
note: ‘The eventual design inherently lacks much of the control over variables 
affecting teacher and pupil performance available to more robust designs and, 
consequently, questions of causality can only be answered at a much lower 
degree of confidence’. These changes were reportedly made for financial 
reasons (ESA, 1999: 6-7). It is unclear what the extra cost would have been, or 
precisely how and why it was decided to use funds in training activities rather 





The final evaluation of Imbewu by ESA was conducted in 2001. In their draft 
report, ESA emphasised once again the deficiencies in the evaluation process 
(ESA, 2001b: 25). ESA underscored especially the absence of any external 
control group of schools that did not participate in Imbewu. If, as the 
Department of Education itself claimed, the improved matric exam results in 
2000 reflected an improvement in the quality of education, then one would 
expect similarly improved test scores in the lower grades also. The lack of any 
external control group rendered it impossible to distinguish between the impact 
of Imbewu specifically and general changes in the schooling system. 
 
ESA also noted a series of problems with the data. For example, baseline test 
scores from one district were suspiciously high. In ESA’s view, they were 
probably ‘contaminated in one way or another’. The same schools produced 
much, much lower test scores in the midterm and final evaluations, giving the 
impression that Imbewu has led to ‘a catastrophic decline’ in pupils’ 
performance! ESA sensibly, if somewhat arbitrarily, decided to omit the data 
from this district in its analysis (ibid: 25-6). 
 
 
Improving the Quality of Evaluation 
 
Work by JET indicates a number of lessons from past evaluations in South 
African education. JET’s conference on ‘Quality and Validity in INSET 
Evaluations’ helped to define the need to assess evaluations critically. Getting 
Learning Right (Taylor and Vinjevold, 1999) helped to sustain this concern. 
JET’s current project (undertaken by Roberts) promises to take it forward. 
 
Roberts provides a pithy summary of the weakness of many of the earlier 
evaluations: 
 
‘Many impact evaluations tend to focus on process variables and 
aspects of school culture and internal relations, rather than looking at 
whether the project has had an impact on the classroom (and if 
changed classroom practices are resulting in improved learner 
achievement). Many projects (and evaluations) focus on doing things 
differently, rather than the quality of what is done, especially at 
classroom level’ (personal communication, April 2001). 
 
JET’s design of a framework for evaluating its Mahlahle project indicates some 





‘The [evaluation] combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
with learner performance testing being conducted in a larger sample of 
schools and in-depth qualitative studies being conducted in a smaller 
sample of these schools. The qualitative studies include interviews, a 
short questionnaire which solicits factual information on the schools 
(e.g. enrolment, staff size), classroom observation and an audit of 
learning support materials. Efforts are made to corroborate what is 
reported in interviews with observed behaviour, administrative and 
management documents and what is actually seen in the school. 
Information on teaching and learning practices is supported by lesson 
observation, discussions with teachers and reviews of learner 
workbooks, assessment records and work plans. The learner 
performance test which is administered is a standardised test which is 
analysed according to performance on each item. 
 
Despite efforts to address many of the limitations, the methodology 
still has its flaws. One of these is the lack of sustained observations of 
teachers over a period of time – the project does not have the funds 
nor the personnel to allow researchers to visit schools for long blocks 
of time or to visit them several times a year. Each school is visited for 
a full day and an expert researcher observes at least four lessons in 
each school’ (Roberts, 2001: 3). 
 
The evaluation process of Imbewu suggested a number of specific lessons. 
Overall, it is apparent that more care must be given to evaluation procedures and 
the necessary requisite funds must be provided in the project budget. Hitherto, 
too much has been done in a rush, with last minute planning, and with 
insufficient funding. 
 
Two of the key weaknesses of the Imbewu evaluation were the inadequacy of the 
control group of schools and the absence of data on the progress made by fixed 
cohorts of pupils over time. The inclusion of a control group is important in 
order to distinguish between the effects of the intervention and other changes 
that might be occurring in schools generally. The testing of a cohort is important 
because it prevents the results of testing being affected by normal variations 
between the ability of successive years of students. Each of these issues has been 
addressed in the evaluation of some other educational interventions. Both 
controls and cohort-testing were included in the evaluation of the READ Umtata 




and the GET-INSET Special Project in Atlantis-Malmesbury (although this 
tracked changes over only seven months) (Fredericks et al., 2001).  Cohort-
testing without a control group was included in the ongoing evaluation of the 
Pilot EQUIP programme (ESA, 2001a). 
 
A notable strength of the Imbewu evaluation was the close integration of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. Careful observation of lessons 
and other activity at schools is crucial in assessing the extent to which training 
and materials are actually being put to use. Combining such observation with 
testing makes it possible to assess systematically different components of a 
programme as well as the overall impact of the programme as a whole. 
Optimally, the test results and qualitative research would be combined with 
information from the education departments’ EMIS database. 
 
Perhaps the best design for an evaluation is the one for the READ/Business 
Trust ‘Learning for Living’ project (ESA, 2000c). Only the baseline study has 
been completed yet, but the design of the prospective follow-up studies over the 
five-year life-span of the project is very impressive. The evaluation seeks to 
answer four key questions: 
 
• Has the project been delivered as designed? 
• Have the practice of teaching and running a school changed in the project 
schools to the extent and in the ways predicted? 
• Has pupil performance in tests improved as predicted? 
• Can these hanging practices and improved results be ascribed to the project? 
 
Tests will be administered to a sample of pupils in each of four grades at each of 
ninety schools (fifty-four project schools and thirty-six control schools). In total, 
7 200 pupils will write the tests each year for five years. The baseline study was 
conducted in 2000 (ibid), with the first retest at the end of 2001. With a large 
sample being tested across a long period of time, this study promises to provide 
very valuable information of what affects student performance and how it can be 
improved. 
There are signs that lessons have been learnt from the experience of evaluating 
programmes such as Imbewu. The project documentation for Mahlahle, the QLP 
and the READ Learning for Living projects all emphasise the importance of 
evaluation and monitoring, including thorough baseline studies (in part to help 
to finalise the design of the projects themselves) and regular follow-up. In the 




testing, but also the collection of data on the schools, community and students’ 
family background. 
 
It is not clear, however, who is the intended audience for evaluations such as 
these (see also Taylor, in JET, 1996: 51). In part, I imagine, it is the donor. In 
large part it is certainly the project managers, who look to ‘evaluations’ for 
indications of how to modify their projects’ design during the course of the 
projects; this is, in other words, a diagnostic function. They may serve a role as a 
‘consultation’ mechanism, and may also serve to jolt actors into a recognition of 
the nature or scale of the problem. But it is not clear that the evaluations are 
intended to help identify lessons for the much larger task of reforming schools 
countrywide. 
 
The process of evaluation is shaped, if not driven, by the particular concerns of 
the donors. Most donors have their own agenda. Foreign donors (such as DfID) 
have to account for their use of funds. Sceptics suggest, with good reason, that 
such donors are more interested in ensuring that funds were spent on the correct 
budget items than they are in achieving the best possible results in terms of 
improved pupil performance. Given the role of political considerations in donor 
generosity and officials’ more immediate self-interest in ensuring the continued 
flow of funds, some donors might want to avoid overly-thorough evaluations 
lest they generate embarrassing results. It is difficult to avoid some cynicism 
about DfID given that it committed to the extension (and enlargement) of 
Imbewu before it had received the final evaluation of the first three-years of the 
programme. 
 
Of the donors active in South Africa, the Business Trust seems to be the most 
thoroughly concerned with evaluations and efficiency. One of the points raised 
by the Business Trust Review Panel on the draft QLP business plan was the 
need for an evaluation process ‘that will ensure the spread of lessons to the rest 
of the country and support the replication of the project’ (JET et al., 1999: 6). 
The response of the QLP team was that the correlation of planned assessments 
of student performance with planned situation analyses at district, school and 
classroom levels would make clear what works and what does not work, and 
thus ‘contribute to the derivation of a model for improving the nation’s schools’ 
(ibid: 24). About R1 million per year was allocated to evaluation and 
monitoring; this amounted to just 3.8 percent of the overall budget. This is a 
great improvement on (for example) Imbewu. It is important, however, to ensure 
that the concerns of the donors (in the case of QLP) are translated into a 




QLP business plan seemed to substitute soothing sentences for critical analysis 
(see eg ibid: 37), and that the appointment of consultants to conduct the 
evaluation may reflect considerations other than maximising quality. 
 
 
What Evaluations Tell Us: Imbewu 
 
The baseline study of Imbewu found that school-level management and 
leadership were poor: basic records were not kept, there was little planning, and 
there was inadequate provisioning of textbooks. The study found that many 
students had language difficulties in the classroom, teaching practices were 
poor, and that teachers seemed to have inadequate knowledge of their subjects. 
Very few teachers provided feedback on students’ written work or administered 
regular tests. The study found that physical factors (including the condition of 
school buildings) were much less important than the extent of commitment 
among principals, teachers, students and parents. 
 
What changes were observed, measured or at least claimed in the midterm and 
final studies? The ultimate objective was, of course, to improve student literacy 
and numeracy. The numeracy and literacy tests used to evaluate student 
performance showed ‘encouraging’ but nonetheless weak indications of a slight 
improvement in student performance between the baseline and midterm studies. 
The sample of students in grades 5 and 7 who were tested was sufficient to have 
some confidence in the results. Among grade 5 students there was only a 
negligible improvement in literacy and numeracy test scores, with the mean test 
scores rising from 21.1 percent to 22.4 percent and from 32.8 percent to 34.6 
percent respectively. Among the grade 7 students, however, there was a 
significant improvement in both literacy and numeracy tests, with mean test 
scores rising from 33.8 percent to 39 percent and 46.6 percent to 51.9 percent. 
Students in five districts were tested. Not all the changes were in the same 
direction: in one of the five districts where pupils were evaluated in both 
baseline and midterm studies, test scores declined in both literacy and numeracy 
tests for both grades 4 and 6; in a second district, test scores declined in two of 
these four categories; but in the other three districts, all mean test scores rose. 
These were small changes, but they were over a short period of time. On the 
other hand, considering that they were rising off a very low base, surely larger 
gains might have been expected? 
 
If the effects on the ultimate goal of student performance were ambiguous, there 




objectives. In view of the ESA midterm study and the earlier study by Perold, 
the JET put a cautiously positive spin on the findings: 
 
‘There is no question that Imbewu is succeeding in providing the 
prerequisite conditions for improving pupil performance in project 
schools. ... There is also evidence that capacity is being built at the 
district level for replicating the project beyond the 523 target schools, 
and for sustaining these gains after completion of [the first three year 
phase of] Imbewu. ... These are remarkable achievements indeed after 
only two years...’ (JET, 2000a: 9-10). 
 
The main change, it is claimed, is in the atmosphere or ethos prevailing in 
schools (JET, 2000b: 14-15). Perold (1999) highlights quotations such as the 
following: ‘Imbewu has brought a renaissance, a rebirth in our schools’ (District 
Manager); ‘Imbewu transforms our teachers, especially their attitudes’ 
(Principal); ‘We were inspired by Imbewu’ (Teacher). 
 
The first activities and modules in the Imbewu programme certainly aimed at 
changing attitudes: the objective of ‘vision crafting’ was to change the attitudes 
of teachers and principals and create the desire to improve schools (JET, 2000b: 
13). Roberts reports that some of the personnel involved in designing and 
implementing Imbewu stressed the change in ‘atmosphere or ethos in 
participating schools (e.g. changed spirit, having a vision, being able to take 
initiative and having pride and ownership of schools)’ (ibid: 14). Perold 
provides anecdotal evidence of improvements in some participating schools 
(Perold, 1999: 31-6). But, as she asks, does enthusiasm deliver results? The 
government’s policy of redeploying teachers serves to undermine gains (ibid: 
37). 
  
Enthusiasm might be widespread but, as Roberts found, the precise objectives of 
the programme were understood less and less well as one moved away from the 
core project personnel (JET, 2000b: 5). Thus project personnel described the 
programme in terms of its stated goal of systemic transformation, whilst 
participating principals and teachers tended ‘to reduce the project’s objectives to 
bite-sized components, often corresponding with the interviewee’s personal 
experience of a particular component of the project or with the development of 





There are said to have been problems with the delivery of training. The use of 
district officials from the Department of Education caused some problems, as 
they were over-stretched and lacked capacity (ibid: 10). 
 
Roberts, in an assessment based on a small number of interviews with principals 
and teachers, found that the main reported benefits concerned improved 
management and administration in schools (ibid: 14-15). Parents were also said 
to have become more involved in school governance. But ESA found that there 
was only a tiny improvement in record-keeping and administration at the school 
level (ESA, 2000a: 39-40).  
 
At the same time, JET acknowledges shortcomings, especially with respect to 
management within the provincial education department. Imbewu has invested 
considerable effort in assisting the Department of Education to improve its 
operations (Perold, 1999: 26-8). Although the evaluation of this is still largely 
impressionistic (see above), ‘it would appear that Imbewu have been very active 
in the areas of strategy and policy, but has had minimal effect in building more 
effective management practices...’ Management systems remain ‘hopelessly 
inadequate’. 
 
‘At the district level it would appear that the influence of Imbewu is 
confined to involving individual officials in the training and support 
programme. While this is undoubtedly a key element in linking the 
work of districts and schools in support of improved teaching and 
learning, more thoroughgoing and lasting change must be dependent 
on the strengthening of district offices, including the building of sound 
management practices. Similarly, at the school level, while Imbewu is 
having a profound influence on the morale and motivation of the 
entire community, impact on institutional management appears to be 
piecemeal rather than systematic’ (JET, 2000a: 10). 
 
JET concluded that  
 
‘The first and most important problem that the second phase of the 
[Imbewu] project needs to get to grips with is the very poor state of 
management which exists at all levels of the EC DoE [Eastern Cape 
Department of Education]: province, district and school. Until an entry 
point can be found for establishing systems for planning, regulating 




schooling will continue to limp along, with projects like Imbewu 
leaving, at best, a transitory legacy’ (ibid:11). 
 
The problems within the Department of Education combined with 
disappointingly weak links between Imbewu and core departmental work meant 
that the project has not achieved the sustainability hoped for at the outset (JET, 
2000b: 19). 
 
JET also acknowledged that changing practices in the classroom ‘are largely in 
the area of form rather than substance’ (JET, 2000a: 11). An external evaluation 
found that Imbewu had brought about more changes in school management than 
in classroom practice. But improved management was largely confined to 
administration, rather than quality assurance. There continued to be weak 
monitoring of quality in the classroom. The ESA found, in their midterm study, 
that: 
 
‘The majority of principals continued to report that teachers will 
accept a check on their presence in the classroom, and their adherence 
to the formal work plan, but they will not accept quality assessment 
and feedback. This may also explain why no schools reported 
classroom visits, or quality monitoring, by the DoE either. The 
principals and teachers continue to assert that the new developmental 
teacher appraisal system will obviate the problem. 
 
It should be noted that, during the course of research, there were 
frequent instances of teachers stopping to take a cell phone call, pupils 
wandering around during class time, remaining outside after break for 
long periods and leaving classes without reference to the teacher. 
None of these indicate a high level of managerial supervision of the 
whole school – if it is so obvious to a researcher, surely it must also be 
obvious to the principal, at least?’ (ESA, 2000a: 40-1). 
 
Many classes were left unsupervised by teachers, who congregated in a separate 
room. There even appears to be a problem with absenteeism. Within the 
classroom, however, there does appear to have been a slight improvement in the 
practice of teaching, with (for example) more planning and more group work. 
But the improvements are marginal, and uneven. The lessons observed and 





The evaluations indicated clearly the need to improve teachers’ knowledge of 
the content of their subjects. According to the ESA: ‘The understanding of many 
teachers of the methodologies encouraged by Imbewu remains simplistic and, in 
some cases, an increase of disordered and undirected activity was observed in 
classrooms as a result of their greater use’. Moreover: ‘Teachers tend to 
overemphasise the methodological components of their lessons to the detriment 
of the content they are presenting. When they are, in addition, not fully in 
control of these methodologies, the level of content presented in lessons often 
appears trivial indeed’ (ibid: 5).  Perold makes a similar finding (1999: 49). 
 
The final evaluation of Imbewu provides further dispiriting evidence of the lack 
– or at least slow pace – of change. The study found no or weak evidence of 
improved pupil performance in the tests. The test results might suggest very 
minor improvements in literacy test results in the younger grades, but there was 
no improvement whatsoever in numeracy test scores. Moreover, pupils 
continued to use woefully inadequate methods for solving arithmetic problems. 
Over the two-year period, as we saw above, schools in Phase 1 showed an 
improvement of just 4.2 percentage points in the grade 5 literacy test, 0.9 
percentage points in the grade 5 numeracy test, and 2.0 percentage points in the 
grade 7 literacy test. The scores in the grade 7 numeracy test declined by 0.4 
percentage points. With the exception of the grade 5 literacy test results, the 
changes are insignificant in comparison with the error factor, and even the grade 
5 literacy test improvement is very small. Moreover, a comparison of the 
baseline, midterm and final evaluation test scores shows that there were no clear 
trends. Indeed, overall test scores had declined between the mid-term and final 
study, suggesting that participation in Imbewu might have had a temporarily 
positive but unsustained effect (perhaps related to the conduct of the evaluation, 
i.e. what sociologists call a ‘Hawthorne effect’). The Phase 2 schools also 
showed insignificant changes. Trends in numeracy tests were, however, also 
worse than trends in literacy tests. 
 
ESA suggest that the lack of impact on measured numeracy performance might 
reflect the severity of prior inadequacies in numeracy teaching (2001b: 27). In 
other words, numeracy teaching is so bad in many schools that even a well-
designed intervention will have little or no effect in the short-term (or perhaps 
even the medium- or longer term). The strongest evidence for this came from a 
close study of the notes that pupils made in solving arithmetic problems. Even in 
classes where teachers had benefited from Imbewu training, pupils continued to 
tackle multiplication and division problems by altering them into addition and 





‘Since these methods (the baseline report referred to them as a lack-of-
a-method) realistically amount to nothing more than counting on one’s 
fingers, and have not altered at all since the initiation of the project, 
there is really no surprise in the fact that pupils demonstrate no impact 
in numeracy of any kind. Indeed, I would say that the average child 
was fundamentally innumerate before the project started and remained 
fundamentally innumerate after it ended.’ (ibid: 29) 
 
The mean test scores by grade are set out in Table 2. Note that the Phase 1 
participants had received two years of Imbewu activity, but the Phase 2 
participants just one year. (The suspect results for Grade 5 in one district are 
omitted, as noted above). This data is not for fixed cohorts of students, but rather 
for successive cohorts of students in each of the two grades. The results are not 
encouraging.  
 
Table 2: Mean test scores by grade, Imbewu 
 
Literacy Numeracy Grade Phase Pre Post Pre Post 
Phase 1 19.7 23.8 31.7 32.7 5 Phase 2 14.8 14.1 27.5 26.4 
Phase 1 33.8 35.8 46.6 46.2 7 Phase 2 22.6 23.3 41.8 39.5 
Source:  ESA, 2001b. The G5 Phase 1 scores are calculated excluding the deviant district. 
 
Their observation of lessons in practice served broadly to confirm some of the 
misgivings already noted in the mid-term report. ESA found that there were 
clear changes in teaching methods and practices within the classroom but it is far 
from clear that the quality of teaching has really improved. It seems that many 
teachers have learned to adopt the new and ‘approved’ teaching methods but 
‘without becoming observably more proficient in the essential skill of choosing 
and controlling methodologies appropriate to topic, class, and content’ (ibid: 
40). Too few classes passed beyond trivial and superficial levels, too many 
classes were clearly replicating a ‘model’ lesson learnt in a Imbewu training 
session, worryingly many teachers seemed to have an inadequate grasp of the 
subject matter, and some appeared to struggle to teach in English. There was 
some evidence that pupils spoke more often in class than two years previously, 
but there was no change in the time spent reading or writing. Pupils spent more 




effectively. ESA report that in only 20 percent of the lessons observed did pupils 
ask a single question. One of the few clear improvements was in the availability 
of textbooks, with a sharp drop in the proportion of classes where only the 
teacher had a textbook. 
 
Researchers also found many schools where too little teaching was taking place. 
‘All of the researchers commented on the number of pupils who regularly 
wander around schools at all times, teachers absent from classes while pupils sat 
unattended, and those who presented cursory lessons when a visitor was not 
expected’ (ibid: 38). This reflects poorly on school management, as well as the 
teachers concerned. ‘Those schools in which ordered management and 
teaching/learning took place on a routine basis were almost all the schools in 
which such practices were already evident at the time of the baseline study’ 
(ibid: 38). 
 
ESA also collated for the final evaluation a mass of information on what 
principals, teachers and so on said about the effects of Imbewu. Participants 
were almost universally positive but were typically vague as to what precisely 
had changed for the better – just as ESA had found in the mid-term evaluation. 
When pressed, principals claimed most often that teachers were more motivated, 
more positive, and combined better as a team. Teachers mentioned most often 
improved teaching methods (ibid: 32-4). Principals reported that Imbewu had 
improved their financial and other managerial skills. There was said to be more 
community and parental participation in the school, but this had not prevented 
vandalisation of the schools concerned.  
 
The final ESA report has only just been completed in draft form, and is yet to be 
finalised. It is unclear whether there will be some kind of composite assessment 
of Imbewu. Given that DfID have already committed massive resources to the 
extension of the programme, regardless (it seems) of the assessment to date, it 
seems unlikely that there will be a strong impetus for such a composite 
assessment from the donor’s side! The provincial education department also has 
mixed incentives to conduct a thorough-going, composite assessment. 
 
The documentation prepared for and by JET is remarkable in its candour, and 
deserves considerable praise. But it neglects entirely the question of cost. There 






Comparing the Evaluations of Different 
Programmes 
 
Imbewu has been scrutinised more closely than most programmes, but it is not 
unique. A number of other programmes have been evaluated in comparable (and 
sometimes, as we have seen, better) ways. These include a number evaluated by 
ESA, whose work generally is of the highest quality. Given that the goal of 
treating educational interventions as experiments is to learn what works and 
what does not, what have we learnt from interventions to date? 
 
Two READ programmes have been evaluated thoroughly: the READ 
programme in Umtata district over the period 1995-98 and the programme in 
Kei-Komga district over 1997-99. In both cases tests of pupil performance 
indicated sharp improvements in reading and writing skills across both short and 
longer periods of time. Table 3 sets out the improvement in test scores of fixed 
cohorts of students across just one year, comparing pupils in schools 
participating in the READ programme with pupils in a control group of non-
participating but otherwise similar schools in the area. The first cohort of pupils 
tested was in Grade 5 in 1997 and Grade 6 in 1998. The second cohort was in 
Grade 6 in 1997 and Grade 7 in 1998. 
 
These test results show that READ achieved significant and consistent 
improvements in reading and writing. Table 4 summarises the difference 
between the improvement for pupils in READ schools and pupils in the control 
group. Given the low cost, at just R53 per pupil per year, this seems to be a 




Table 3: Improvement in test scores for fixed cohorts: READ Umtata 
project  
 
Cohort  Improvement in reading test score 
Improvement in writing 
test score 
Project + 27.4 + 36.3 I (G5 to G6) Control +   2.9 + 23.2 
Project + 31.6 + 41.1 II (G6 to G7) Control +   1.0 + 23.0 
Source:  READ, 1999: 20 
 
 
Table 4: Difference in improvement in test scores, project compared to 
control cohorts: READ Umtata project  
 
Cohort Difference in improvement in reading test score 
Difference in improvement 
in writing test score 
I (G5 to G6) + 24.5 + 13.3 
II (G6 to G7) + 30.0 + 18.0 
Source:  READ, 1999: 21 
 
The evaluation of the READ programme in the Kei-Komga area entailed testing 
of four cohorts of students over a period of between two and three years. The 
baseline study was conducted early in 1997, and the final study at the end of 
1999. The first cohort was in grade 3 at the beginning and had completed grade 
5 at the end; the other cohorts were in grades 5/7, 7/9 and 9/11 respectively. The 
differences between changes in test scores for each cohort of pupils in READ 
schools and pupils in the control group are set out in Table 5 below. The positive 
scores indicate that pupils in READ schools were improving considerable faster 
than those in the control group (with the exception of the third cohort’s reading 
test scores, but these may reflect an influx of pupils into grade 9 who had not 
been in READ primary schools; this interpretation is supported by the fact that 
successive cohorts of grade 9 pupils in the READ schools improved their 
reading test scores relative to successive cohorts in the control group – ESA, 
2000a: 21). By the end of the programme, pupils in READ schools were 
performing at about the same level in the reading and writing tests as pupils two 





Table 5: Difference in improvement in test scores, project compared to 
control cohorts: READ Kei-Komga project  
 
Cohort Difference in improvement in reading test score 
Difference in improvement 
in writing test score 
I (G3 to G5) +  8.9 + 17.0 
II (G5 to G7) + 23.1 + 17.2 
III (G7 to G9) -   0.1 + 15.9 
IV (G9 to G11) +  4.8 + 20.7 
Source:  ESA, 2000c: 21, under para 3.3.1 
 
It must be noted that the ‘cohort’ being tested is not a pure cohort in every case. 
Optimally, the cohort would comprise a fixed panel of pupils, who are retested 
at regular intervals regardless of whether they are promoted into successive 
grades or required to repeat. Assessing a fixed panel of pupils requires that 
firstly, pupils’ names are recorded, secondly there is low rates of movement 
between schools or out of school, and thirdly, that the listed pupils attend school 
on the days that retests are conducted. (In a perfect evaluation, pupils should be 
tracked and retested even if they move schools or drop out of school altogether, 
but that would require considerable extra cost.) Attrition out of school means 
that an initial panel of (say) twenty-five pupils per class might be reduced to 
fifteen pupils per class two or three years later. A comparison of the test results 
then requires careful attention to the character of attrition, i.e. who is falling out 
of the panel and why. These problems are small, however, compared to the 
problems of analysing data if a pure panel is not used. In some evaluations the 
names of pupils were not recorded in the baseline study. So a ‘retest’ of a class 
one year later would probably only catch those pupils in the original panel who 
were promoted to the higher grade, excluding students who were held back and 
including for the first time students that were in the higher grade the previous 
year but were held back in it. 
 
An evaluation of the impact of EQUIP at mid-term, i.e. after one year, indicated 
that cohorts of pupils in project schools had made absolute progress, but that 
only one of the two cohorts had made progress relative to the control group. 
Table 6 sets out the improvement in mean test scores for pupils in the project 





Table 6: Improvement in test scores for fixed cohorts: EQUIP  
 
Cohort  Improvement in literacy test score 
Improvement in 
numeracy test score 
Project + 10.5 + 13.2 I (G4 to G5) Control + 12.4 + 14.4 
Project + 13.2 + 13.1 II (G5 to 
G6) Control +   6.6 +   7.8 
Source:  EQUIP, 2000 workshop overhead 
 
 
Table 7: Difference in improvement in test scores, project compared to 
control cohorts: EQUIP  
 
Cohort Difference in improvement in literacy test score 
Difference in improvement 
in numeracy test score 
I (G4 to G5) -  1.9 -  1.2 
II (G5 to G6) + 6.6 + 5.3 
Source:  EQUIP, 2000 workshop overhead 
 
It would be wise to avoid reading too much into these results, and to wait for the 
final project evaluation to assess trends in performance over a longer, two-year 
period. But at first glance, the literacy test score results are very disappointing, 
even if the numeracy test results are more promising.  
 
The evaluation of the first year of GET-INSET’s special project in the Atlantis 
and Malmesbury area of the Western Cape was on a smaller scale. Pupils in 
grades 4 to 6 in five schools that participated in the project were tested in April 
and November of the same year, and the results compared to a control group of 
pupils in two neighbouring schools that were not part of the project. The small 
samples may explain why the results were very mixed and it is hard to discern 
any overall pattern. The absence of any pattern, however, is disappointing, since 
it suggests that there is no discernable improvement in the performance of pupils 
in schools that participated in the project relative to pupils in the control group. 
 
Of the programmes discussed above, Imbewu and GET-INSET appear to have 
disappointing outcomes in terms of measured pupil performance, whilst 
READ’s programmes result in a dramatic improvement; EQUIP’s mid-term 
results are somewhat mixed.  These findings need to be treated with some 




different test instruments were used. Secondly, careful attention needs to be paid 
to details of the studies: How large was each sample of pupils? Was the control 
group really a control group? Were cohorts pure or pseudo-cohorts? And so on. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly of all, some programmes might be 
expected to have an impact over a longer time period than others. READ 
interventions are heavily geared to what happens inside the classroom. Improved 
teacher training and teaching materials might translate into sharp improvements 
in pupils’ performance in writing and reading tests. Imbewu, however, is focused 
in significant part on school management also. Improved school management 
might translate into improved pupil performance very slowly. This is not an 
argument for disregarding the results of an evaluation, but rather for designing 
and interrogating them more carefully, looking for discernable relationships 
between (say) observed improvements in management and measured pupil 
performance. 
 
If there is a time-lag between the intervention and measurable results in terms of 
improved pupil performance, are there perhaps indicators which could be used 
in the meantime that would enable us to predict the subsequent improvement in 
pupils’ performance? Several programmes have sought to develop sets of 
indicators of performance with respect to the key mechanisms by which the 
intervention is expected to affect (eventually) pupils’ outcomes. EQUIP’s set 
comprises twenty indicators in seven ‘performance areas’. Unfortunately, the 
only way of telling what indicators are really ‘useful’ in that they do predict 
future changes in pupils’ performance is to conduct a series of experiments and 
demonstrate that there is a clear relationship. Well-designed evaluations should 
provide information not only on what works, but also on what indicators help to 
reveal what is working. 
 
It is possible that pupils will sometimes not benefit from an intervention 
however long the time period over which the intervention–and the evaluation– 
run. In reflecting on the slow improvement in numeracy test scores, Schollar 
wonders whether some pupils are so disadvantaged by the inadequacy of their 
initial education that they can never make significant progress thereafter. This 
would be a worrying finding. If true, it would require efforts to be directed to the 
very first stages of primary or even pre-primary education. Experimental 






Designing Evaluations and Interventions to 
Assist in Policy-Making 
 
Crouch (1999: 1) has suggested that running an education system without 
indicators is like flying a jumbo jet without an altimeter or a compass or any of 
the other gauges that provide essential information! The analogy should not be 
overdone, however. The field of education is unlike flying a jet plane in that we 
lack a basic understanding of the mechanics of education. Pilots know how an 
aeroplane works, and know how to respond when they receive certain data from 
one of their gauges. If (I imagine) the gauges reveal that the engine speed is 
dropping, the pilot knows that the solution is to step on the gas. In education, 
acquiring precise data on a whole lot of variables is only one step in the right 
direction, as we need to know how the different variables are (or can be) linked. 
We don’t know which control to push even if our gauges are working well. Will 
pupils’ test scores improve more if we pump extra gas into post provisioning, if 
we turn up instead the supply of textbooks, or we adjust the flaps of 
management training? In order to learn how the education machine works, and 
how it might be improved, we have to study it in operation, and especially study 
the effects of experimental interventions in management, textbook supply or 
whatever. The effects of these different interventions need to be compared, 
critically, and with an eye on their cost. 
 
Several years ago Jansen advocated clearly that comparative evaluations be 
done: 
 
‘[I propose] that comparative evaluation studies be designed and 
conducted with the deliberate goal of examining the value of rival 
programmes not with the goal of discarding the less successful 
(although this might be necessary in an extreme case) but with the aim 
of transferring lessons learned across projects. This means that 
comparison is built into the design (and the selection of comparable 
cases) from the start rather than in retrospective studies on set designs’ 
(Jansen, in JET, 1996: 18). 
 
This is little evidence that this call has been heeded. 
 
The comparison of different programmes or interventions would, of course, be 
much easier if they had employed broadly standardised test instruments. The 




Imbewu schools and the changes in GET-INSET schools, and so on. If 
information was also available on the costs of the interventions, then policy-
makers would have the information needed to make choices as to what kinds of 
interventions achieve the best results at the least cost. 
 
This is where the provincial and national departments of education can and 
should be playing a far more active role. Only the departments have the interest 
and capacity to assess all of the various interventions in their jurisdiction that are 
working with similar groups of students. The way to do this assessment is surely 
to organise a standardised assessment of cohorts of students in schools that are 
participating in each of the many programmes (as well as control groups of 
students who are participating in none). None of the existing forms of evaluation 
and assessment will serve precisely this purpose. What is needed is focused 
external testing of cohorts of students, linked to careful observation and 
interviewing, on an annual basis. Few – if any – of the provincial education 
departments are organised in ways that facilitate this kind of research. 
 
A set of experimental interventions in the Philippines in the early 1990s shows 
what can be done. The Dropout Intervention Programme entailed four 
experimental interventions, randomly assigned to primary schools in selected 
low-income areas. Data was collected on dropout rates and pupils’ performance 
in from the schools prior to and following the intervention, as well as from a 
control group of schools over the same time period. The interventions focused 
on a school feeding scheme on its own, the same scheme combined with parent-
teacher partnerships, the provision of multi-level learning materials on its own, 
and the same scheme combined with parent-teacher partnerships. The 
experiment was flawed (with inadequate testing of pupils’ performance, 
especially) and the actual findings are irrelevant. But the experiment indicates 
that it is possible to run routine systems for evaluating alternative policy options 
(Tan et al., 1999). 
 
Huge sums are invested in education in South Africa, but tiny sums are invested 
in learning the lessons of this investment. Even when evaluations are done, they 
are done in an uncoordinated way, and little effort is put into learning general 
lessons from specific evaluations. South Africa is currently making an 
astonishingly uninformed investment in education. This is not only a possibly 
colossal and absurd waste, but is also a huge missed opportunity. If we get the 
investment wrong, it costs the taxpayer a lot of money and children better 
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economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy In Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 
 
